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Who Can Win in Truth in Lending
Rescission Transactions?
I. INTRODUCTION
The Truth in Lending Act' (hereinafter called "the Act") allows a con-
sumer three days in which to rescind a credit transaction in which a second
mortgage is taken on the consumer's principal residence.' In many situations
consumers can cancel their loan agreements long after the three-day period
set up by Congress because the creditor has not given proper Truth in
Lending disclosures.
Rescission long after consummation of the transaction creates many
problems for creditors. Some courts have construed the statutory language
dealing with the consumer's rescission procedure as requiring that the
creditor forfeit both the loan and the loan payments, leaving him with
nothing. A creditor who does not follow strictly the statutory rescission
procedure may end up also paying the consumer civil damages.4 Compliance
with the Truth in Lending Act is so difficult that creditors often do not know
that they have violated it.5 And creditors are often reluctant to refund the
consumer's money upon rescission, as required by the statute, because it may
be impossible for them to get the loan proceeds back from the consumer.
6
Consumers also have problems when the transaction is cancelled long
after its consummation. Many times creditors refuse to follow the statutory
rescission procedure by failing to cancel the security interest in the con-
sumer's home, thus making it difficult for the consumer to transfer the proper-
ty.7 In addition, some courts, basing their actions on equity principles, have
I. 15 U.S.C. § 1601-1667e (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The Act authorizes the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System to issue regulations for its implementation. Id. § 1604. In 1969 the Board issued the
original version of its Truth in Lending regulations, Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.1-. 1503 (1981), which also
implements the Fair Credit Billing Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1666-1666j (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
In 1980 Congress enacted the Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act (hereinafter called "the
Simplification Act-), Pub. L. No. 96--221, 94 Stat. 168 (1980), which amends among other things various
rescission provisions of the original Act. See text accompanying notes 118-29 injra. To implement these
amendments, the Board in 1980 issued a revised Regulation Z, 46 Fed. Reg. 20,892 (1981) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. 88 226.1-.29). Although both the Simplification Act and Revised Regulation Z became effective on April
I, 1981, Congress has given creditors the option of complying with the original Act and Regulation until October
I, 1982. International Banking Facility Deposit Insurance Act, Pub. L. No. 97-110, § 301, 1981 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS (95 Stat.) 1513, 1515; Amendments to Regulation Z, 47 Fed. Reg. 755 (1982).
The effects of the Simplification Act and the Revised Regulation Z are discussed in text accompanying
notes 118-29, 133, 138 & 143 injra. Because many cases will arise concerning transactionsconsummated under
the original law, because the cases discussed in this Note all construe old law, and because many of the
problems with the old law have survived the amendments, this Note discusses generally Truth in Lending
rescission procedures and draws distinctions between the old and new law only where necessary for clarity.
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (1976); 12 C.F.R. § 226.9 (1981).
3. See text accompanying notes 68-90 infra.
4. See text accompanying note 60 infra.
5. See text accompanying notes 43-56 inira.
6. See text accompanying notes 61-63 infra.
7. See text accompanying notes 64-67 infra.
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completely set aside the statutory rescission procedure and used a procedure
less favorable to the consumer.8 These courts require the consumer to pay
back the entire loan before he can rescind, while the statutory Truth in
Lending procedure allows the consumer to rescind, receive back all the pay-
ments he has made to the creditor, and then pay back the loan.9
This Note will discuss the Truth in Lending right of resission and its
normal operation,' and will illustrate the problems that arise in connection
with a transaction that has been rescinded long after consummation." The
Note will then examine the effect of the Truth in Lending Simplification and
Reform Act'2 (hereinafter called "Simplification and Reform Act" or "Sim-
plification Act") upon these problems and will offer some suggestions for
further legislative reform. " Finally, it will propose procedures that both cred-
itors and consumers can use to protect themselves.14
II. THE TRUTH IN LENDING RIGHT OF RESCISSION
A. Scope of Coverage
The Truth in Lending Act 5 and its implementing regulation, Regulation
Z,16 allow consumers to rescind credit transactions 17 under certain circum-
18
stances . This right of rescission is intended to provide the consumer with a
cooling-off period prior to taking the serious step of pledging his home as
security in a credit transaction.' 9 The regulation provides:
[I]n the case of any credit transaction in which a security interest is or will be
retained or acquired in any real property which is used or expected to be used as
8. See text accompanying notes 94-112 infra.
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (b) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
10. See text accompanying notes 15-38 infra.
11. See text accompanying notes 39-114 infra.
12. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 168 (1980) (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667); see text accompanying
notes 118-29 and 142-44 infra; see also note 1 supra.
13. See text accompanying notes 130-45 infra.
14. See text accompanying notes 146-67 infra.
15. U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); see note I supra.
16. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-.1503 (1981); see note I supra.
17. In both its original and revised versions, Regulation Z uses its definition of creditor to identify what
transactions are covered. In the original version,
[a creditor is] a person who in the ordinary course of business regularly extends or arranges for the
extension of consumer credit, or offers to extend or arrange for the extension of such credit, which is
payable by agreement in more than four installments or for which the payment of a finance charge is or
may be required, whether in connection with loans, sales of property or services, or otherwise.
12 C.F.R. § 226.2(s) (1981). The revised version of the Regulation defines the creditor, and therefore the
transaction, more simply as
(I) A person (i) who regularly extends consumer credit that is subject to a finance charge or is
payable by written agreement in more than 4 installments (not including a downpayment), and (ii) to
whom the obligation is initially payable, either on the face of the note or contract, or by agreement
where there is no note or contract.
(2) An arranger of credit.
46 Fed. Reg. 20,893 (1981) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 226.2).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); 12 C.F.R. § 226.9 (1981).
19. See Federal Reserve Board Opinion Letter, Oct. 31, 1969, reprinted in [1969-1974 Transfer Binder]
CONSUMER CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 30,205.
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the principal residence of the customer, the customer shall have the right to
rescind that transaction until midnight of the third business day following the date
of consummation of that transaction or the date of delivery of the disclosures
required under this section and all other material disclosures required under this
part, whichever is later.
20
The rescission right does not apply to certain transactions exempted from the
Act. They are: (1) purchase money first mortgages on dwellings in which the
consumer resides or expects to reside, (2) first mortgages in connection with
an initial construction, (3) previously exempt liens that are now subject to
subordination, (4) transactions in which the creditor is a state agency, and (5)
loans for agricultural purposes.2  In short, the rescission right generally
applies to transactions by which a security interest, constituting a second
mortgage, is taken on a consumer's principal residence by a private creditor.
However, Regulation Z defines a security interest very broadly to include
even liens arising as a matter of law. The term encompasses
security interests under the Uniform Commercial Code, real property
mortgages, . . . consensual or confessed liens .... mechanics, materialman,
artisans and similar liens, vendors liens in both real and personal property, the
interest of a seller in a contract for the sale of real property, any lien on property
arising by operation of law, and any interest in a lease when used to secure
payment or performance of an obligation.
22
Therefore, if a contractor puts aluminum siding on a principal residence al-
ready subject to a first mortgage and obtains a materialman's lien, the lien,
which arises by operation of law, is considered a second mortgage and triggers
the pertinent provisions of the Act and Regulation. The consumer then has a
three-day period in which to rescind the transaction.
B. Explanation of Rescission Rights
The three-day rescission period that arises in connection with a second
mortgage on a principal residence does not begin to run until three different
events take place. First, two copies of the notice of the right of rescission
20. 12 C.F.R. § 226.9 (1981) (emphasis supplied).
21. Id. § 226.9(g). Exempted by the Revised Regulation Z are
(I) [M]ortgages created or retained in the consumer's principal dwelling to finance the acquisition or
initial contruction of that dwelling; (2) refinancing or consolidation by the same creditor of an extension
of credit already secured by the consumer's principal dwelling; (3) transactions in which the creditor is
a state agency; (4) an advance, other than an initial advance, in a series of advances under an agreement
to extend credit up to a certain amount, which is considered as one transaction; and (5) a renewal of
optional insurance premiums not considered a refinancing.
46 Fed. Reg. 20,905 (1981) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(f)).
22. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(gg). The Revised Regulation Z defines security interest as
an interest in property that secures performance of a... credit obligation [of a consumer extended
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes] and that is recognized by state or federal law. It
does not include incidental interests such as interests in proceeds, accessions, additions, fixtures,
insurance proceeds ... premium rebates, or interests in after acquired property .... [Flor purposes
of the right of rescission under §§ 226.15 and 226.23, the term does include interests that arise solely by
operation of law.
46 Fed. Reg. 20,894 (1981) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a) (25)) (emphasis supplied).
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must be delivered to each consumer involved in the transaction. Second,
one copy of all the "material" disclosures required by Regulation Z, pertain-
ing to the credit transaction, must be given to each consumer.24 Third, the
transaction must be consummated.? The rescission period begins to run only
after the last of these three events occurs.
To exercise these rescission rights, the consumer must notify the creditor
by mail, telegram, or other writing of his intention to rescind before midnight
of the third business day after the rescission period begins to run.26 This
differs from the right of rescission at common law. At common law the
rescinding party was required to tender restitution, but under the Act the
borrower can rescind by simply giving notice.27 Thus, the consumer can
rescind by simply depositing a notice in a mailbox just before midnight of the
third business day! 8 Furthermore, the creditor is prohibited from performing
under the agreement until the rescission period has expired and he is reason-
ably satisfied that the consumer has not exercised his right of rescission.29
The Act contemplates that a very simple procedure be followed once the
consumer exercises his rescission rights. The consumer is not liable for any
finance charge, and any security interest taken in the property becomes
23. "Disclosures required under this section," 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(g) (1981), refers to the notice of the right
to rescind. Under Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(e) (1981), when there is more than one consumer, disclosures
need be given to only one of them unless it is a rescindable transaction. Hence, a husband and a wife will each be
considered a consumer, and two copies of the notice of the right of rescission must be given to each of them.
R. CLONTZ, TRUTH-IN-LENDING MANUAL 5.03[71 (4th ed. 1976 & Supp. 1980).
The Revised Regulation Z makes this even clearer. A consumer who is entitled to rescind is defined as a
consumer "whose ownership interest is or will be subject to the security interest." 46 Fed. Reg. 20,904 (1981)
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)). Two copies of the notice of the right to rescind shall be delivered to
each consumer who is entitled to rescind. Id. at 20,905. Thus if both a husband and wife have an interest in the
property, two copies of the right to rescind notice must be delivered to each.
24. The required disclosures include "all other material disclosures required under this part." 12 C.F.R.
§ 226.9 (1979). The authority and scope section of Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.1 (1981), provides: "This part
comprises the regulations issued... pursuant to [the Truth in Lending Act]. Therefore, "part" means Regula-
tion Z. The Revised Regulation Z provides an explicit definition of"material." 46 Fed. Reg. 20,905 n.48 (1931);
see also text accompanying notes 53-56 infra and note 13 supra.
25. "Consummation" is not defined in the original version of Regulation Z. Under that version a transac-
tion has been considered consummated at the time a contractual relationship is created between a creditorand a
consumer according to state laws. R. CLONTZ, supra note 23, at 5.03[11]. According to Clontz, transactions
could be consummated in three ways: (1) A bank allows the covered creditor to grant the loan commitment,
conditioned upon favorable title search, credit report, and the consumer's agreement to the terms; (2) the
institution has the note and deed drafted and executed by all consumers, but holds the loan instrument in
abeyance or escrow until the rescission period has expired; or (3) the creditor uses a document such as the one
drafted by Clontz himself and termed "Consummation of Loan Secured by Real Property." Id. at r 5.03[2].
The Revised Regulation Z defines "consummation" as "the time that a consumer becomes contractually
obligated on a credit transaction." 46 Fed. Reg. 20,893 (1981) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)).
26. 12 C.F.R. § 226.9 (1979).
27. Comment, Consumer Protection: Judicial Approaches to Rescission and Restoration Under the Truth
in Lending Act, 53 WASH. L. REV. 301,304 (1978); see also Rachbach v. Cogswell, 547 F.2d 502,505 (10th Cir.
1976), in which the court held that tender was not a prerequisite to rescission under the Truth in Lending Act.
28. R. CLONTZ, supra note 23, at 9 5.03[4].
29. 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(c) (1981). The creditor cannot: "(1) Disperse any funds other than in escrow; (2)
Make any physical changes in the property of the customer; (3) Perform any work or services for the customer;
or (4) Make any deliveries to the customer's residence." Id.; see also R. CLONTZ, supra note 23, at 5.03[3].
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void. ° Within ten days3l of receipt of the rescission notice, the creditor is
required to return any money or property given by the consumer as a payment
on the credit transaction or downpayment or "otherwise" and must take any
action necessary to reflect the termination of the security interest. 2 The
consumer can keep any money or property the creditor has delivered to him
pursuant to the credit transaction, until the creditor has performed the above
obligations. 3* Once the creditor has performed these obligations, the con-
sumer is required to tender back the property delivered to him by the creditor,
or if that would be impracticable or inequitable, to tender its reasonable
value.3a Thus, if the consumer wishes to rescind a cash loan, the cash must be
tendered back. If aluminum siding has been put on a house, it will be im-
practicable to tender the siding and therefore its reasonable value should be
tendered instead. Once the consumer's tender is made, the creditor has ten
days to take possession of the tendered property.35 Failure to do so results in
forfeiture, which gives the consumer the right to keep the property with no
obligation to pay for it.
36
An example of the ordinary operation of the Truth in Lending rescission
procedure follows: A consumer, who does not have the first mortgage paid on
his home, decides to take out a loan for home improvement. As security for
this loan, a second mortgage is taken on the consumer's home, and the con-
sumer is required to make a downpayment. Two days after receiving the loan,
the consumer reconsiders and drops a rescission notice in a mailbox. When
the bank receives the rescission notice, within ten days37 it must send the
consumer's downpayment back to him and terminate on all records the secur-
ity interest in the consumer's home. The consumer then tenders back all the
money he has received under the loan.38 If the bank fails to take possession of
the money within ten days, the consumer can keep the money.
30. 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(d) (1981).
3 1. The Simplification Act and Revised Regulation Z have extended this period to 20 days. Pub. L. No.
96-221, § 612(a) (3), 94 Stat. 168, 175 (1980) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) ); 46 Fed. Reg. 20,905 (to be codified
at 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(d) (2)); see text accompanying notes 124-25 infra.
32. 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(d) (1981).
33. R. CLONTZ, supra note 23, at c, 5.03[5].
34. 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(d) (1981).
35. Id. The Simplification Act and Revised Regulation Z have extended this period to 20 days. Pub. L. No.
96-221, § 612(a) (3), 94 Stat. 168, 175 (1980) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a)); 46 Fed. Reg. 20,905 (to be codifed
at 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(d) (3)); see text accompanying notes 124-25 infra.
36. 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(d) (1981).
37. But see notes 31 & 35 supra (effect of Simplification Act).
38. Tender must be made at the location of the property or at the residence of the customer, at the option of
the customer. 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(d) (1981). Revised Regulation Z provides: "At the consumer's option, tender of
property may be made at the location of the property or at the consumer's residence. Tender of money must be
made at the creditor's place of business." 46 Fed. Reg. 20,905 (1981) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(d)
(3)).
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III. PROBLEMS ARISING IN CONNECTION WITH TRUTH IN
LENDING RESCISSION RIGHTS
A. Creditor Difficulties
1. Dilemma of Complying with Disclosure Procedures
As mentioned, three different events must take place before the three-
day rescission period begins to run. 9 Two copies of the notice of the right of
rescission must be delivered to each consumer,40 one copy of all material
disclosures required by Regulation Z must be given to each consumer' 4  and
the transaction must be consummated.42 If the creditor fails to meet any of
these requirements, the three-day rescission period never begins to run and
the consumer can rescind at any time within three years following the date of
consummation of the transaction or until he sells the property.43 Compliance
with the three requirements is not easy; Regulation Z requires such a host of
disclosures that it becomes a veritable Gordian knot for the creditor to untie.
The cases are replete with examples of creditor noncompliance with the
three requirements. Some examples are: understatement of the amount of
finance charge because of a failure to include the premium for dwelling insur-
ance; 4 omission of the amount financed;45 failure to disclose the annual rate
of interest;46 provision of an improper notice of the right to rescind; 7 mis-
statement of the annual percentage rate;48 failure to provide two copies of the
rescission notice to both the husband and the wife49 omission of the total
number of payments to be made; 50 and use of the term finance charge in a
confusing manner.5 Many creditors are unsure of what disclosures they must
make under Regulation Z and are "penalized for technical Regulation Z viola-
tions." 5 12
Regulation Z causes part of the confusion about what disclosures are
39. See text accompanying notes 23-25 supra.
40. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
41. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
42. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
43. 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(h) (1979).
44. Harris v. Tower Loan, 609 F.2d 120 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1980). This premium is
required to be included in the finance charge under 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a) (6) (1979).
45. Palmer v. Wilson, 359 F. Supp. 1099 (N.D. Cal. 1973), vacated, 502 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1974). The
amount financed is required by 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(d) (1) (1979).
46. Strader v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 191 Colo. 206, 551 P.2d 720 (1976). The annual percentage rte is
required by 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b) (2) (1979).
47. Powers v. Sims & Levin, 542 F.2d 1216 (4th Cir. 1976). The creditor inadvertently informed the
consumers that they had the right to rescind within two days instead of three. Id. at 1219.
48. Bustamente v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 619 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1980).
49. Gerasta v. Hibernia Nat'l Bank, 411 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. La. 1975), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 575 F.2d
580 (5th Cir. 1978); see note 23 supra.
50. Palmer v. Wilson, 359 F. Supp. 1099 (N.D. Cal. 1973), vacated, 502 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1974). The
disclosure of the number, amount, and due dates or periods of payments scheduled to repay the indebtedness is
required by 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b) (3) (1979).
51. Palmer v. Wilson, 359 F. Supp. 1099 (N.D. Cal. 1973), vacated, 502 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1974). Regulation
Z requires that the disclosures be clear, conspicuous, and in a meaningful sequence. 12 CFR. § 226.6(a) (198 I).
52. R. CLONTZ, supra note 23, at 5.03 [4a] (c).
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required. It requires only that "material" disclosures be made but does not
define "material." 53 Presently, creditors are forced to rely on case law to
determine materiality. Many courts overlook the issue of materiality in their
discussion of Truth in Lending, thereby giving creditors little guidance. One
court, however, has addressed the issue. In Ivey v. Hud54 the finance charge
was understated by $11.30, but this was found not to be a material violation of
the Truth in Lending Act. The court held that a material disclosure is one
"which a reasonable consumer would view as significantly altering the total
mix of information made available." 55 One commentator has argued that to
be "material," the omission need not be so important that a reasonable con-
sumer would change creditors, but it must be of some significance to a
reasonable consumer in his "comparison shopping for credit.- 56 Thus, cred-
itors attempting to follow Ivey must test each disclosure to determine whether
it is something a reasonable consumer would view as significant. Such a
flexible test is difficult for creditors to use confidently.
In short, creditors have great difficulty in determining what disclosures
must be made under Regulation Z. Consequently, many creditors unknowing-
ly fail to meet the three requirements that start the three-day rescission period
running, and their consumers therefore can rescind long after the transaction
has been consummated.
2. Creditor Confusion About What Procedure
to Follow After Rescission
When the consumer exercises the right of rescission long after con-
summation, the creditor is often in a quandary about what course of action he
should follow. If the creditor believes he has complied with all requirements
of the Truth in Lending Act, he will not be eager to respond to the debtor's
claim to rescission.5 7 A creditor who has properly complied with all require-
ments and who honors the consumer's claim for rescission will be giving up a
finance charge that he has rightly earned.
However, because it is difficult to comply with the Truth in Lending Act
and Regulation Z in the first instance, it is a Herculean task for the creditor to
be certain that he has met all of the disclosure requirements. The majority of
cases clearly hold that when a creditor wrongly believes he has made all the
proper disclosures, or is uncertain about that fact, his failure to act within ten
53. The original version of Regulation Z called for disclosure of "all other material disclosures required
under this part." 12 C.F.R. § 226.9 (1981) (emphasis supplied). The simplification Act provides a definition of
"material disclosure." Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 612, 94 Stat. 168, 175 (1980) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1602(v)); 46
Fed. Reg. 20,905 (1981); see also text accompanying notes 120-21 infra; note I supra.
54. 428 F. Supp. 1337 (N.D. Ga. 1977), aff'd mene., 607 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1979).
55. Id. at 1343.
56. R. CLONTZ, supra note 23, at 5.03[4a].
57. Griffith, Truth in Lending: Some Aspects, 26 DE PAUL L. REV. 566, 588-89 (1977).
58. When a consumer exercises his right to rescind, he is not liable for any finance or other charge. 12
C.F.R. § 226.9(d) (1981).
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days to perform his required rescission duties will subject him to civil liabil-
ity.'9 This liability may consist of the consumer's actual damages, punitive
damages of twice the finance charge (but neither less than $100 nor more than
$1000), and if the consumer is successful, payment of the consumer's attorney
fees and court costs.60 Additionally, the consumer will still be able to rescind
the transaction. Hence, the creditor has merely ten days from receipt of the
rescission notice to decide whether to honor the consumer's rescission, a
decision that can have grave financial consequences for him.
Another problem is added to this quagmire when the creditor faces a
judgment proof consumer who attempts to rescind the transaction. A con-
sumer might be judgment proof when he is bankrupte' or owns very little from
which a creditor can collect a judgment. This is essentially a no-win situation
for the creditor. If he has not complied with all disclosure requirements, he is
required to act within ten days to reflect the termination of any security
interest and return any payments the consumer has made. Failure to do so
within ten days subjects the creditor to civil liabilities.62 However, if the
creditor does tender the payments back to the judgment proof consumer, he
might never see the loan proceeds that the consumer is required to return to
him. The creditor's problems are complicated even further in certain jurisdic-
tions by virtue of court interpretations of the rescission procedure.6s
B. Consumer Difficulties
The rescission procedure outlined by the Act causes consumers dif-
ficulties only when creditors do not comply with it. First, if the creditor fails
to disclose the consumer's right of rescission, many consumers will never
learn of this right.64 Oblivious to their prerogative, many consumers will bear
harsh financial arrangements that they would have avoided had more details
been disclosed to them before the transaction was consummated. This is a
burden Congress intended to remove 5 Second, consumers face a difficult
situation when creditors ignore the rescission notice. If the creditor does not
act to terminate the security interest and return the consumer's payments, the
rescission has had no effect. Because the security interest is still reflected on
the lender's books, the consumer will have great difficulty selling his proper-
59. See Harris v. Tower Loan, 609 F.2d 120, 123 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1980); Eby v. Reb
Realty, Inc., 495 F.2d 646, 647-48 (9th Cir. 1974).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
61. See text accompanying note 95 infra.
62. See text accompanying notes 59 & 60 supra.
63. See text accompanying notes 72-93 infra.
64. Sosa v. Fite, 498 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1974), illustrates the situation in which the consumer does not know
about the right to rescind. In that case the consumer rescinded only after the bank had foreclosed the mortgage
on her home and she had consulted an attorney. Id. at 116-17.
65. The congressional purpose in requiring the creditor to disclose credit terms was "so that the consumer
will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of
credit." 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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ty.66 The consumer must then bring suit to enforce his rights. The delay
accompanying such a suit can cause further hardship on the consumer. Some
of these problems have been eliminated in certain jurisdictions by virtue of
court interpretation of the rescission procedure. 67
C. Court Inteipretation of Rescinded Transactions and Effects Upon Parties
As mentioned, 6 Regulation Z sets up a simple rescission procedure: (1)
the consumer rescinds; (2) the creditor has ten days to terminate the transac-
tion and give back any money or property given by the consumer to the
creditor; (3) once the creditor has performed these acts, the consumer must
tender back to the creditor the property he has received as part of the trans-
action; and (4) if the creditor does not accept the tender within ten days the
consumer can keep the property without any obligation to pay for it.69 How-
ever, this procedure has not operated as smoothly as Congress intended.
Courts have reached widely varying results when consumers have rescinded
transactions several months after their consummation. Variations are espe-
cially evident in the federal circuit courts. In handling the rescission pro-
cedure, the courts have split into two major factions: pro-consumer courts70
and pro-creditor courts.
7
'
1. Pro-consumer Courts
The leading pro-consumer jurisdiction is the Fifth Circuit. One of its most
important cases was Sosa v. Fite,72 in which a consumer entered a home
improvement contract by which aluminum siding was installed on her home
and a second mortgage taken as security.73 Proper Truth in Lending dis-
closures were not given, and the consumer rescinded ten months after enter-
ing into the contract.74 At the time she rescinded, the consumer also expressly
tendered back the property to the creditor. After receiving no response from
the creditor, the consumer brought suit to enforce the rescission under the
Truth in Lending Act.75 The court of appeals concluded that because the
66. Comment, Consumer Protection: Judicial Approaches to Rescission and Restoration Under the Truth
in Lending Act, 53 WASH. L. REV. 301, 305-07 (1978).
67. See text accompanying notes 72-93 infra.
68. See text accompanying notes 30-36 supra.
69. 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(d) (1979).
70. Federal pro-consumer jurisdictions appear to be the First Circuit, see French v. Wilson, 446 F. Supp.
216 (D.R.I. 1978), the Fifth Circuit, see Sosa v. Fite, 498 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1974), and the Tenth Circuit, see
Strader v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 191 Colo. 206, 551 P.2d 720 (1976). It is unclear whether the Sixth Circuit should
be classified as pro-consumer. It indicated its willingness to follow the pro-consumer courts but then in effect
followed the pro-creditor courts. See Rudisell v. Fifth Third Bank, 662 F.2d 243 (6th Cir. 1980).
71. Federal pro-creditor jurisdictions are the Fourth Circuit, see Powers v. Sims & Levin, 542 F.2d 1216
(4th Cir. 1976), and the Ninth Circuit, see Palmer v. Wilson, 502 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1974). The Sixth Circuit has
also shown a willingness to follow the pro-creditorjurisdictions. See Rudisell v. Fifth Third Bank, 662 F.2d 243
(6th Cir. 1980); see also note 70 supra.
72. 498 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1974).
73. Id. at 116.
74. Id. at 117.
75. Id. at 118.
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creditor had failed to perform his obligations within ten days after rescission
and tender, he had forfeited the loan proceeds. 76 Thus, the court held that
when a consumer rescinds and tenders at the same time, both ten-day periods
run simultaneously. The creditor not only must terminate the agreement and
return the consumer's money within ten days, but must also accept the con-
sumer's tender of property within the same ten-day period or forfeit it.
77
Recent cases indicate that the Sosa doctrine is alive and well in the Fifth
Circuit and jurisdictions that follow it. In Gerasta v. Hibernia National
Bank 78 a home improvement loan was cancelled after six months for lack of
proper Truth in Lending disclosures. The creditor neither terminated the
agreement nor returned the consumer's payments within the first ten-day
period. The court distinguished Sosa, in which the consumer had made an
express tender at the time of rescission; in Gerasta the consumers had refused
to tender, and therefore, the court held, the second ten-day period had not
begun to run as it had in Sosa and the bank had not forfeited the loan.7 9 A
footnote in the Gerasta opinion casts some doubt on whether Sosa was still
good law: "Sosa was decided pursuant to the pre-1974 version of § 1640 [the
civil liability damages provision], which limited the applicability of § 1640 to
creditors' failures to make required disclosures. We do not consider the ques-
tion of the continued validity of the Sosa decision in light of the 1974 amend-
ment. ,,80
Recently, however, the Sosa doctrine was clearly revitalized in Harris v.
Tower Loan.8' In Harris the court stated, "We reaffirm the statutory lan-
guage and the holding in Sosa that the creditor loses any rights in property
unaccepted ten days after tender by the obligor. '"" The court, however,
allowed the creditor to offset the value owed to him from the money he
returned to the consumer.8
3
Sosa was also upheld in Bustamente v. First Federal Savings & Loan
Association84 in which the consumer attempted to make a Sosa tender to start
both ten-day periods running at once. However, the court distinguished
Sosa and held that the consumer's tender of property was improper because
he tendered only the monthly installment payments as they became due, not
76. Id. at 119-20.
77. The court implies, however, that had the creditor performed the duties normally required of him within
the first ten-day period, he would have had a second ten days in which to accept the tender. Id. at 119 n.6.
78. 575 F.2d 580 (5th Cir. 1978).
79. Id. at 582-85. The Gerasta opinion is an anomaly. The court ruled that the creditor must perform his
obligations of terminating the loan and returning the consumer's money or property. In essence it suspended the
first ten-day period since the creditor did not have to tender until the court had rendered judgment. The court
further allowed the consumers a reasonable time after the creditor's tender in which to tender the property back
to the creditor. Id.
80. Id. at 584 n.3.
81. 609 F.2d 120 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1980).
82. Id. at 123.
83. Id.
84. 619 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1980).
85. Id. at 362.
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the proceeds of the loan as the Act requires. Consequently, the second ten-
day period leading to forfeiture by the creditor had not begun to run. 6
Thus, a creditor in the Fifth Circuit or a jurisdiction that follows it7 risks
the possibility of forfeiting all loan proceeds by a failure to act within ten days
if a consumer properly performs a Sosa tender. Many of these pro-consumer
jurisdictions follow the exact reasoning of Sosa. However, an Ohio court took
a different approach in Hank's Auto Sales, Inc. v. Fisher.88 The creditor had
accepted a cognovit note as payment, thereby obtaining a security interest in
the consumer's residence, but had failed to make any Truth in Lending dis-
closures. When the consumer rescinded, the creditor took no action. The
consumer did not perform a Sosa tender, yet the court held that the creditor
forfeited the loan principal and was subject to civil liabilities.89 The court
essentially reached a Sosa result without a Sosa tender. The court gave no
reasoning for this result, one which appears to directly contradict the Act and
Regulation.
A recent Sixth Circuit opinion casts doubt on the continued validity of
this decision. In Rudisell v. Fifth Third Bank the consumers were not given
Truth in Lending disclosures when a mechanic's lien was taken in their home
upon the installation of aluminum siding. The lack of disclosure enabled them
to rescind nearly three years after consummation of the transaction. The
consumers did not perform a Sosa tender, but since the creditor did not
perform his obligation within ten days, the consumers claimed that the cred-
itor forfeited the loan proceeds and was also required to return their pay-
ments. Essentially, the consumers claimed that the court should follow the
ruling in Hank's Auto Sales, but the Rudisell court concluded that such a
result cannot be achieved without a Sosa tender.9' Although the court in-
directly overruled the decision in Hank's Auto Sales, it implied that it would
follow Sosa in an appropriate case.92
When the results of these pro-consumer cases are added to the many
other problems a creditor faces upon rescission,93 it is apparent that the Truth
in Lending Act can work a real hardship on creditors.
2. Pro-creditor Courts
Jurisdictions that can be characterized as pro-creditor94 have interpreted
the rescission procedure in a way that alleviates some of the creditors' prob-
lems. However, these decisions greatly burden consumers. In Palmer v.
86. Id. at 362-65.
87. See note 70 supra.
88. 38 Ohio App. 2d 1, 310 N.E.2d 259 (1973).
89. Id. at 2-6, 310 N.E.2d at 260-62.
90. 662 F.2d 243 (6th Cir. 1980).
91. Id. at 254; see text accompanying notes 107-12 inira.
92. 662 F.2d 243, 254 (6th Cir. 1980).
93. See text accompanying notes 39-63 supra.
94. See note 71 supra.
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Wilson95 the creditor failed to disclose several required credit terms, includ-
ing the amount financed, the number of payments, and the right to rescind.
The failure to disclose enabled the consumer to rescind long after consumma-
tion of the loan. Because the consumer was bankrupt and judgment proof, the
creditor feared that he would lose all payments and the loan proceeds if he
complied with the statutory procedure.96 The Ninth Circuit held that it could
exercise its equitable powers to condition the granting of rescission on the
consumer's first tendering the loan principal back to the creditor9
7
The Palmer court in effect turned the Truth in Lending rescission pro-
cedure back into a common-law rescission. 98 Common-law rescission re-
quires the rescinding party to first tender restitution. When this is done, the
contract is void. The rescinding party may then bring an action in replevin or
assumpsit to have the consideration he has paid restored to him.99 However,
when Congress enacted the Truth in Lending Act it sought to facilitate en-
forcement of the consumer's rights by abrogating the affirmative duty to
tender first and instead required only that the consumer give notice.l °
The Palmer court's actions have grave consequences for the consumer.
To cancel a transaction, the consumer must first procure the entire loan
proceeds and tender them. If the statutory rescission procedure were follow-
ed, he could utilize the payments tendered back by the creditor to help him
raise the loan proceeds, which he would then be required to tender back to the
creditor. Furthermore, the statutory rescission procedure outlined by the
Truth in Lending Act automatically terminates, upon notice of rescission, any
security interest the creditor has in the consumer's property.' ' However,
under Palmer and the common law, the security interest remains intact until
the consumer can raise the amount necessary for his tender'02 and makes it
difficult, if not impossible, for the consumer to sell his property during this
period.
Another case in which a court used its equitable powers to require that
the consumer tender prior to rescission was Powers v. Sims & Levin.' 3 In
that case the consumer pledged his home to obtain a loan and used only half of
the loan proceeds to make improvements on his houseY' 4 The creditor vio-
lated the Truth in Lending Act by informing the consumer that he had only
two days, instead of the required three, in which to rescind. The consumer
95. 502 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1974).
96. Id. at 861-62.
97. Id. at 861-63. The court felt it inequitable to require the creditor to tender money back when he has
had no guarantee that he can obtain the loan proceeds from the consumer. Id. at 862.
98. See Note, Truth-in-Lending: Judicial Modification of the Right of Rescission, 1974 DUKE L.J. 1227,
1229-31, 1239-42.
99. Id. at 1229-31.
100. Id. at 1231-34.
101. 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(d) (1979).
102. Note, Truth-in-Lending: Judicial Modification of the Right of Rescission, 1974 DUKE L.J. 1227,
1239-42.
103. 542 F.2d 1216,(4th Cir. 1976).
104. Id. at 1218.
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rescinded several months after consummation but the creditor took no action.
The consumer then sent another rescission notice and expressly offered to
return the property that constituted the improvements to his home.'0 5 The
court found that since the consumer had used only approximately half of the
loan proceeds on his home, the consumer had not tendered the entire loan
proceeds back to the creditor. The court held that the consumer's action was
an anticipatory breach and that the rescission would not be enforced unless
the consumer first tendered the entire loan.'06
The Sixth Circuit has also followed the approach used in the Palmer and
Powers cases.'0 7 As mentioned,' 8 in Rudisell an Ohio creditor failed to give
Truth in Lending disclosures when he obtained a materialman's lien on the
consumer's property by installing aluminum siding.' 9 The court held that the
consumer could rescind nearly three years after consummation of the trans-
action but conditioned the rescission on the consumer's first tendering the
reasonable value of the aluminum siding."0 The Rudisell court reasoned that
because rescission is an equitable remedy, a court may condition rescission on
the return of money by the consumer."'
This is the furthest departure yet from the statutory scheme established
in the Truth in Lending Act and is clearly unwarranted. In the Palmer case the
court invoked principles of equity to avoid forfeiture because the consumer
was bankrupt. In Powers the consumer's anticipatory breach justified the
court's invocation of equity. However, in Rudisell, the consumer was not
bankrupt and there was no indication that the consumer would not return the
loan proceeds. There was no justification for invoking equity principles other
than the court's belief that the common-law rescission procedure would
'most nearly put the appellants in the position they were in before they
entered the transaction."'
2
Thus, in the pro-creditor jurisdictions the courts are using their equitable
powers to circumvent the statutory rescission procedure and convert it into a
common-law rescission which requires tender first by the rescinding party.
One commentator"' has suggested that these courts are utilizing their equit-
able powers in an incorrect manner. By using equity principles, the courts
claim to be discerning the spirit or principle of the statute "to give effect to the
intent of the legislature rather than the language chosen to express that
intent."" 4 Generally such modification is appropriate only when:
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1221-22.
107. Rudisell v. Fifth Third Bank, 662 F.2d 243 (6th Cir. 1980).
108. See text accompanying notes 90-92 supra.
109. 662 F.2d 243, 245 (6th Cir. 1980).
110. Id. at 254.
IlI. Id.
112. Id.
113. Note, Truth-in-Lending: Judicial Modification of the Right of Rescission, 1974 DUKE L.J. 1227,
1241-42.
114. Id. at 1237.
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(1) the language of the statute is so narrow that it precludes application of the law
to a situation which the court believes the legislature intended to reach; or (2) the
statutory language is so ambiguous that its literal interpretation would seem to
expand the coverage of the statute beyond that which the legislature intended.1
5
Even if an argument can be made that one of these two appropriate situations
exists, the pro-creditor courts have not properly attempted to carry out the
legislative intent. Congress clearly intended to abrogate common-law rescis-
sion by eliminating the requirement for an initial tender." 6 By requiring such a
tender, these pro-creditor courts are not only failing to carry out legislative
intent, but are acting in contravention of it. Arguably then, the pro-creditor
courts that have resorted to common-law rescission procedures have im-
properly exercised their equitable powers. However, the Simplification Act
has validated the procedures used by these courts by specifically authorizing
the courts' discretionary reliance on equity principles"
7
IV. EFFECT OF THE TRUTH IN LENDING SIMPLIFICATION
AND REFORM ACT ON RESCISSION
Congress in 1980 passed the Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform
Act." 8 This Act revises many parts of the original Truth in Lending Act,
including the rescission provisions. Although both the Simplification Act and
the Revised Regulation Z became effective on April 1, 1981, creditors' com-
pliance with the new law is optional until October 1, 1982." 9 The amendments
relevant to this Note are of two types: (1) those designed to make compliance
with the Act easier so that the three-day period will more likely start to run at
the time the disclosures are first attempted and (2) those designed to help
creditors determine whether rescission is proper when a consumer attempts
to rescind long after the consummation of the transaction.
Creditors have had difficulty complying with the orginal Truth in Lending
Act because they are required to make all material Regulation Z disclosures
but "material" was never defined.2 The Simplification and Reform Act does
define "material disclosures:"
The term "material disclosures" means the disclosure, as required by this title, of
the annual percentage rate, the method of determining the finance charge and the
balance upon which a finance charge will be imposed, the amount of the finance
charge, the amount to be financed, the total payments, the number and amount of
payments scheduled to repay the indebtedness.'
2 1
115. Id.
116. Note, Jtdical Erosion o the Rescission Right Under Trnth-in-Lending, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
979, 985-88 (1978).
117. See text accompanying notes 126-28 infra.
118. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 168 (1980) (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667).
119. Id. at § 625, 94 Stat. 185. Originally, compliance was voluntary only until April 1, 1982. Subsequently,
however, the period was extended for six months. Pub. L. No. 97-110, 95 Stat. 1515 (1981).
120. See text accompanying notes 53-56 supra.
121. Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 612(a) (2), 94 Stat. 168, 175 (1980) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1602(v) (1976)).
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The definition will reduce confusion as to which terms must be disclosed to
the consumer, making it easier to comply with the Act. However, a creditor
may still be uncertain whether any arithmetic errors are material. Therefore,
although the new definition will cut down on litigation and the creditor's
problems, it will not eradicate them all.
One excellent change Congress made via the Simplification and Reform
Act was the addition of a requirement that the Federal Reserve Board draw up
model forms.22 Any creditor who uses the forms is deemed to be in compli-
ance with the Act's disclosure requirements in all respects except arithmetic
disclosures.' 3 However, even if a creditor uses these model forms, not only
might he disclose incorrect mathematical computations, but he may also make
other Truth in Lending violations, such as giving the incorrect number of
copies to each consumer. Thus, the rescission period can still extend past its
normal three days despite the definition of "material" and the availability of
the Federal Reserve forms.
Both the definition and the new forms will help creditors determine
whether rescission is proper long after consummation. If the model forms
were used, a creditor will need to determine only whether they were com-
pleted properly, whether all the material disclosures were correctly made,
whether arithmetic computations are correct, and whether proper rescission
procedures were followed. This is still quite a lot for the creditor to do, but the
new amendments made this task much easier than it is under the original act.
The Simplification and Reform Act also made a change in the rescission
procedure itself. It extended the two ten-day periods to twenty-day periods,'
4
so that the creditor will have twenty days from receipt of the rescission notice
in which to terminate the loan obligation and return the consumer's money or
property. And the creditor does not forfeit the loan proceeds until twenty
days after the consumer tenders them. Extension of the periods to twenty
days gives the creditor more time in which to determine whether he is in
violation of the Act and whether rescission is proper, but it is doubtful that it
will alleviate many of the rescission problems discussed above.'25 The Sosa
tender is still available to consumers, the judgment proof consumer can still
rescind, and many creditors will still be uncertain whether the rescission is
valid, even though they have twenty days instead often. Perhaps the Simplifi-
cation Act's requirement that tender of money be made at the creditor's
designated place of business will alter the method of performing a Sosa
tender. Instead of just being able to tender in the notice of rescission that is
sent in the mail, a consumer might have to rescind and tender at the creditor's
place of business for a valid Sosa tender to take place.
122. Id. at § 605, 94 Stat. 168, 170 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1604).
123. Id.
124. Id. at § 612(a) (3), 94 Stat. 168, 175 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (1976)).
125. See text accompanying notes 39-93 supra.
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Congress has relegated these remaining problems to the courts. The
Simplification and Reform Act specifically authorizes the courts to use their
equitable powers to change the rescission procedures: "The procedures pre-
scribed by this subsection shall apply except when otherwise ordered by a
Court. 12 6 The provision was explained in the Senate Committee Report:
Upon application by the consumer or the creditor, a court is authorized to
modify this section's procedures where appropriate. For example, a court might
use this discretion in a situation where a consumer in bankruptcy or wage earner
proceedings is prohibited from returning the property. The committee expects that
the courts, at any time during the rescission process, may impose equitable condi-
tions to insure that the consumer meets his obligations after the creditor has
performed his obligations as required under the Act.
27
This resolves the controversy over whether courts were exceeding their
equitable powers by changing the rescission procedure. s
In short, the Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act takes a step
in the direction of clearing up some difficulties with rescission, but it still
leaves many of the problems unresolved. 9
V. PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER CONGRESSIONAL AMENDMENT OF THE
TRUTH IN LENDING RESCISSION PROCEDURE
Congress should take further action to alleviate some of the problems
that still exist under both the current law and the Simplification Act. 30 The
procedure for rescission within the normal three-day period outlined by
Congress has not given rise to serious difficulties and there is no apparent
need for any amendment of that procedure. Only when rescission is exercised
long after consummation of the loan do problems arise. Therefore, these
proposed amendments to the Act and Regulation Z should apply only to
rescission long after consummation of the loan.
Currently, a consumer can rescind a transaction by merely sending a
notice that says, "I rescind." '3' Some problems could be abated by requiring
the consumer to specify his grounds for his rescission in the rescission
notice." This would greatly facilitate the creditor's determination of whether
he is in compliance with the Act and whether the consumer truly has the right
to rescind. If the creditor uses the model forms permitted by the Simplifica-
tion and Reform Act,133 this determination will become even easier. The
creditor will assume less risk in his determination of the correctness of his
disclosures.
126. Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 612(a) (4), 94 Stat. 168, 175 (1980).
127. S. REP. NO. 96-368.96th Cong.. 2d Sess. 29. reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 264.
128. See text accompanying notes 113-16 supra.
129. See text accompanying notes 39-116 supra.
130. Id.
131. 12 C.F.R. § 226.9 (1979); see also R. CLONTZ, supra note 23, at 1 5.03[5].
132. Griffith, Rescission and Civil Liability: Some Peculiarities of Truth in Lending and Real Estate
Transactions, 6 REAL EST. L.J. 275, 283 (1978).
133. See text accompanying notes 124-28 supra.
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Furthermore, the statute should be amended to permit expressly the right
of setoff by the creditor. In Harris v. Tower Loan' 4 the creditor failed to
include the premium for fire insurance in the finance charge, an error that
enabled the consumer to rescind the transaction after the normal three-day
period. The court held:
Nothing in section 1635(b) prevents the creditor from offsetting the value owed to
it by the obligor from the sum it initially tenders to the obligor. Such an arrange-
ment prevents a perfunctory exchange of funds and protects the lender from a
dissipation of the money while it is in the hands of the obligor. We believe this to
be an acceptable course because it is the only means to insure the accomplishment
of the congressional purpose of restoring the parties to the status quo ante while
affording the statutory remedies to the obligor.1
35
Under this procedure, if the amount already paid by the consumer is greater
than the principal of the loan, because of interest and other charges, the
creditor would have only to notify the consumer that he is performing an
offset and return the difference between the payments made and the principal.
If the payments made by the consumer are less than the loan proceeds, the
creditor would be relieved from the obligation of returning anything to the
consumer and the consumer would have to return only enough money to
equal the loan principal. Such a procedure would alleviate many creditors'
fears that they will never regain the loan proceeds and will also lose the
payments previously made to them. 36 Including this procedure in the Truth in
Lending Act and Regulation Z would extend to all jurisdictions the security
creditors now enjoyed only in those that follow Harris.
If the Act were amended to include these safeguards, the results of the
pro-creditor jurisdictions would no longer be necessary. The creditor would
know the reason for rescission, and he could protect himself from the judg-
mentproof consumer by using the setoff procedure. These courts would have
no necessity to require that the consumer tender first.
The final major issue for possible legislative amendment is whether the
Sosa tender should be expressly abolished in the Act and Regulation Z. The
goal of the court in Sosa was to prevent a standoff in which the consumer
rescinds and the creditor does nothing. 37 A Sosa tender forces a creditor to
act quickly in performing his rescission duties: the creditor is subject to civil
liability if he does not perform within the required time-ten days under the
current Act, twenty under the Simplification Act.'38 The Sosa tender thus
threatens a double penalty to creditors-the imposition of not only the civil
liabilities, but also a forfeiture of the loan principal.
If Congress did abolish the Sosa tender, the consumer would lose a very
valuable tool with which to force quick creditor action. Without a Sosa
134. 609 F.2d 126 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1980).
135. Id. at 123.
136. See text accompanying notes 61-63 supra.
137. 498 F.2d 114, 119 (5th Cir. 1974).
138. See text accompanying notes 59-60 supra.
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tender, the only penalty a creditor faces for not acting within the required time
is the civil liability. 139 Although the threat of liability would be sufficient to spur
many creditors into action, it is evident from Congress' initial inclusion of the
forfeiture in the Act that it wanted to give the consumer greater leverage than
mere civil liability could provide.
However, the imposition of this forfeiture within a single ten-day period
is brutal. The ten-day period is such a short time for creditors to take action
that instead of hastening creditors in the performance of their rescission
duties, it has imposed a very harsh double penalty on creditors who have
found it impracticable to comply so quickly.'40 In most cases, the Sosa tender
has resulted in an automatic forfeiture by the creditor.' 4' The Sosa tender
cannot further the goal of forcing creditors to perform quickly when it is
practically impossible for creditors to act in that amount of time.
Congress has acted in the Simplification Act to extend the two ten-day
periods to twenty-day periods.42 When creditors are thus given a longer
period of time in which to decide whether to honor the consumer's rescission
notice and to perform their duties under the rescission procedure, the Sosa
tender and its attendant forfeiture are not so harsh. Instead of causing auto-
matic forfeiture, as it has in the past,43 the Sosa tender merely requires the
creditor to hasten his performance and not ignore the rescission notice. The
Sosa rule was originally designed to prevent a standoff in which the creditor
refuses to act, not to cause an automatic forfeiture whenever the procedure
was invoked. The new provision makes it much more practicable for a credi-
tor to act under the statute or take measures to preserve his rights. 44 There-
fore, since the Sosa tender provides a consumer with good leverage to force a
creditor to act within a short period of time and since Congress has amelior-
ated the doctrine's harshness by extension of the creditor performance
period, the Sosa tender should not be expressly abolished by Congress.
VI. PROPOSED SAFEGUARDS FOR CREDITORS AND CONSUMERS
Although the current Truth in Lending rescission procedure causes some
difficulties for the parties, actions can be taken to improve one's position until
Congress alleviates these problems.
A. Creditor Procedures
When a consumer performs a Sosa tender, a creditor's choices are not
limited to honoring the rescission within ten days or forfeiting the loan pro-
139. See id.
140. See text accompanying notes 72-93 supra.
141. None of the creditors in the pro-cohsumer cases complied with the statutory rescission procedure
within the required ten days. If the Sosa tender had been properly used, there would have been automatic
forfeiture in all of these cases. See text accompanying notes 72-93 supra.
142. See text accompanying notes 124-25 supra.
143. See text accompanying notes 72-93 supra.
144. See text accompanying notes 145-60 infra.
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ceeds. There are other actions he might take. A creditor might simply accept
the tender by the consumer and therefore not forfeit the loan proceeds. The
consumer may have included a recital of tender in his rescission notice only to
invoke the effects of the Sosa rule and may have had no actual intention of
tendering. By attempting to accept the consumer's recited tender, the creditor
can ascertain whether the consumer is truly tendering.45 Many consumers
will not have the money necessary to make a true tender. If the creditor tries
to accept what turns out to be a consumer's false tender, the second forfeiture
period never begins to run.
A creditor should, however, be aware of problems with this procedure.
The Truth in Lending Act provides that whoever willfully and knowingly fails
to comply with any of its requirements shall be fined up to $5000 or be
imprisoned up to one year or both. 46 If the creditor accepts a tender by the
consumer but does not perform his obligations within the required time, the
consumer could claim that it is a willful and knowing violation. The consumer
could argue that if the creditor has accepted the consumer's tender, he has
recognized it as a valid rescission and that therefore his failure to perform his
obligations is a willful disregard of the rescission procedure. 47 Thus, the
creditor could become subject to both civil and criminal liability.
To avoid criminal liability, a creditor could try depositing the tender in
escrow. 148 By so doing, the creditor does not recognize the rescission as valid,
but merely states that he is uncertain of its validity and will leave the money in
escrow until the determination can be made. The advantages of this procedure
are clear. The creditor safeguards himself against forfeiture of the loan pro-
ceeds by testing whether the consumer has made a true tender. 49 If the
consumer has made not a true tender but merely a recital of tender, the
forfeiture provisions of Sosa never come into effect. Because the creditor has
used an escrow account, the consumer can no longer claim the creditor is
willfully and knowingly violating the Act.50 The only apparent disadvantage
of this procedure is that a creditor will still be subject to civil liability for not
performing within the required period.
An alternative method for avoiding criminal liability is for the creditor to
accept the consumer's tender under protest.' 5' If the creditor protests the
consumer's rescission and tender, he does not recognize it as a valid rescis-
145. See Federal Reserve Board Opinion Letter, Oct. 21, 1969, reprinted in [1969-1974 Transfer Binder] 4
CONSUMER CRED. GUIDE (CCH) v 30,205. A consumer must take some affirmative action to tender property
to the creditor. Locking the property in his house and leaving is not a tender.
146. 15 U.S.C. § 1611 (1976).
147. However, in no reported case have the criminal sanctions been imposed.
148. See Aetna Fin. Co. v. Franklin, No. 761072 (W.D. La., filed Jan. 10, 1977), holding that it was
sufficient under § 1635(b) that a creditor deposit funds paid by a rescinding debtor into escrow.
149. See note 145 supra.
150. 15 U.S.C. § 1611 (1976).
151. U.C.C. § 1-207 provides support for performing under protest: "A party who with explicit reservation
of rights performs or promises performance or assents to performance in a manner demanded or offered by the
other party does not thereby prejudice the rights reserved. Such words as 'without prejudice', 'under protest' or
the like are sufficient."
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sion and his failure to perform within the required time should not be a willful
and knowing violation.
52
Another way the creditor may avoid forfeiture and both civil and criminal
liability is by filing a declaratory judgment action within the forfeiture period,
after receipt of the consumer's rescission notice, asking the court to determine
whether the transaction is in fact rescindable.53 The creditor should also
either move the court to require the consumer to pay his tender into court, or
accept the tender and pay it into court himself.'54 This action will test whether
the consumer is making a true tender that will start the forfeiture period
running. To be most effective, the petition should also ask that rescission be
conditioned upon full restitution of the principal or net amount of the credit
extended to the consumer.
55
In Aetna Finance Co. v. Franklin156 the consumer performed a Sosa
tender. The creditor accepted the tender and then filed a declaratory judgment
action in the federal district court and deposited the accepted tender into
escrow with the clerk of courts. The consumer moved to dismiss the action on
the ground that the creditor had not acted within ten days to comply with the
Truth in Lending rescission procedure. 57 The court denied the motion.
Although the case was subsequently settled, it stands for some important
propositions. First, the case illustrates that a creditor can avoid civil and
criminal liability by filing a declaratory judgment action. If the judge had
granted the consumer's motion to dismiss, the creditor would have been
subject to both forms of liability. Thus, filing a declaratory judgment action
can suspend the time for creditor performance. Second, the case illustrates a
method for the creditor to avoid forfeiture in the face of a Sosa tender. This
creditor deposited the tender in an escrow account when he filed his declara-
tory judgment action.
The filing of a declaratory judgment action would work best in the pro-
creditor jurisdictions, where courts are already predisposed to conditioning
rescission upon the consumer's tendering first. 58 These courts would be more
likely to condition rescission upon full restitution of the principal or net
amount of the credit extended to the consumer, especially if the consumer is
unable to pay the tender into court. And a declaratory judgment action could
be used to avoid civil liability even when there has been no Sosa tender.
One final procedure available to the creditor is to offset the amount the
consumer owes him from the amount he tenders back to the consumer. This
was expressly permitted in a pro-consumer jurisdiction in Harris v. Tower
152. See text accompanying notes 146-47 supra.
153. R. CLONTZ, supra note 23, at 5.03[5].
154. See text accompanying notes 156-57 infra.
155. R. CLONTZ, supra note 23, at 5.03[5]. The Simplification Act authorizes the courts to vary the
rescission procedures by the use of equity principles. See text accompanying notes 127-28 supra.
156. No. 761072 (W.D. La., filed Jan. 10, 1977).
157. Id.
158. See text accompanying notes 95-112 supra.
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Loan. 59 Furthermore, if the creditor performs this setoff within the required
time, he will not be subject to civil liability and can accept any further
amounts the consumer might owe him.'60 The disadvantage of this procedure
is that the creditor may allow the consumer to rescind a nonrescindable trans-
action and thus lose a finance charge that is rightfully his.
In sum, a creditor can follow several courses of action when a consumer
performs a Sosa tender. He can safely deposit the consumer's tender into
escrow or under protest, file a declaratory judgment suit, or use the right of
setoff to safeguard his position. Additionally, the declaratory judgment suit
and the right of setoff can be used by a creditor to safeguard his position when
there is merely a rescission and no Sosa tender.
B. Consumer Procedures
The rescinding consumer can also take steps to enhance his position
against the creditor. In any jurisdiction a consumer should perform a Sosa
tender. In the pro-consumer jurisdictions, if the creditor is unaware of the
Sosa rule and does not act within the required time, he will forfeit his loan to
the consumer and possibly pay civil damages. 161 In the pro-creditor jurisdic-
tions, creditors often do not incur civil liability because the courts hold that
there is no valid rescission until the consumer has tendered first. 62 By per-
forming a Sosa tender, the consumer will have tendered first, thus leaving the
creditor with no excuse for nonperformance. The consumer could then collect
the civil remedies from a creditor who fails to act within the required time.
The consumer's only problem arises when the creditor attempts to accept
the Sosa tender. It was clear in Sosa that a mere recital of tender was suf-
ficient.63 Only by attempting to accept that tender in some way can a creditor
prove that it is not a true tender.'64 If he proves that it is a false tender, then
the Sosa rule will not apply and the creditor will not forfeit the loan proceeds.
If the creditor does attempt to accept a tender that is merely a recital, he might
be able to claim that the consumer has committed an anticipatory breach by
not returning any of the loan proceeds after having tendered them. To avoid
committing such a breach, the consumer should claim that the tender is con-
ditioned upon the creditor's performance of the statutory requirements.,65
The biggest danger of this conditional tender is a showing that a true Sosa
tender has not been made. Such a showing would weaken the consumer's
position by dispelling the threat that a forfeiture will result from the creditor's
noncompliance.
159. 609 F.2d 120, 123 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1980).
160. See text accompanying notes 59-60 supra.
161. See text accompanying notes 68-93 supra.
162. See text accompanying notes 94-112 supra.
163. 498 F.2d 114, 120 (5th Cir. 1974).
164. See, e.g., Palmer v. Wilson, 502 F.2d 860, 862 (9th Cir. 1974).
165. See Powers v. Sims & Levin, 542 F.2d 1216, 1220-21 (4th Cir. 1976).
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Whether the consumer performs a Sosa tender or not, he should wait
until the creditor's time for performance has passed and then bring suit. By
waiting, the consumer puts the creditor in violation of the statute and can
recover civil damages.166 A consumer can therefore enhance his position in a
rescinded transaction by performing a Sosa tender and then suing the creditor
after the statutory time for the creditor's performance has passed.
VII. CONCLUSION
The case law indicates that the rescission procedure outlined by the
Truth in Lending Act, relating to second mortgages taken in principal res-
idences, has not operated as smoothly as Congress intended. The problems
are due in part to the difficulty creditors have in making all the proper Truth in
Lending disclosures and in part to various court interpretations of the rescis-
sion procedure. In pro-consumer jurisdictions courts have used a Sosa tender
to disadvantage the creditor. In pro-creditor jurisdictions courts have com-
pletely set aside the statutory rescission procedure, causing more difficulties
for consumers.
By enacting the Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act,
Congress intended to further its current trend of legislating for more creditor
protection. The Simplification and Reform Act is in essence a pro-creditor
statute, since many of its provisions safeguard creditor rights. However, this
monument of reform does not go far enough in its protection of the creditor.
The pro-consumer jurisdictions are still able to penalize the creditor, just as
they did before the Simplification and Reform Act was enacted. If Congress
continues its pro-creditor trend, it will correct the inadequacies in the
Simplification and Reform Act. Until it does, the parties should use the pro-
cedures outlined above to safeguard their legal positions.' 67
Robert K. Rupp
166. See text accompanying notes 59-60 supra.
167. See text accompanying notes 145-166 supra.
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